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A Model of Agenda Influence on 
Committee Decisions 
By CHARLES R. PLOTT AND MICHAEL E. LEVINE* 
Within a range of circumstances it ap- 
pears to be possible to control a group's 
decision by controlling only the agenda. 
The boundaries of the range over which the 
agenda is such an overwhelmingly impor- 
tant parameter are not yet known, and the 
exact principles upon which the influence 
rests have not been identified. However, the 
research results reported below provide a 
first step in answering these questions. 
Our approach to this problem originated 
in both practical and theoretical considera- 
tions. As a practical matter, we were in- 
volved in an important and complex com- 
mittee decision. A large flying club in which 
we held membership was meeting to vote 
upon the size and composition of the air- 
craft fleet which would be available to the 
membership for flying. As members we had 
preferences about the fleet available to us 
and an opportunity to shape the agenda. 
Preliminary discussions and meetings had 
narrowed the range of possibilities greatly 
from hundreds of thousands of competing 
alternatives to a few hundred. Over these 
remaining possibilities, however, there were 
conflicting and strongly held opinions. The 
group was to meet once and decide the issue 
by majority vote. 
Principles of economics and game theory 
suggest that the procedures and other insti- 
tutional aspects of committee processes 
should be important in determining the out- 
come. Axiomatic social choice theory and 
voting theory also suggest the importance 
of these variables. Yet, models which char- 
acterize the subtle features of parliamentary 
procedures and the behavior they induce do 
not exist. Thus the practical problem was 
accompanied by an intriguing theoretical 
problem that presented us with the possi- 
bility of developing a mathematical theory 
of procedures and procedural influences on 
group decisions. 
The meeting was held. The group used 
our agenda. The decision was the one we 
predicted.' With this apparent success, we 
then faced a perplexing problem of proof. 
Was the result a happy accident or was the 
decision a direct consequence of our efforts? 
In order to partially resolve this question, 
we turned to experimentation. If by using 
the methods we developed we were unable 
to influence groups involved in conflicts 
similar to the club meeting, then we would 
be willing to dismiss the club experience as 
an accident. 
The experimental results below indicate 
that the club decision cannot be dismissed 
as accidental. The principles we outline for 
determining the agenda's influence are in 
need of improvement, but their fundamen- 
tal importance within a range of circum- 
stances is established. A more refined and 
accurate identification of the principles and 
the ranges over which they are operative 
awaits further research. Even as it stands 
our research has important implications for 
process evaluation and design (see the 
authors). 
The paper is outlined as follows. In Sec- 
tion I, we outline a basic theory and a 
model. Section II includes our experimental 
design and Section III contains the results. 
The last section is a summary of conclu- 
sions. 
*California Institute of Technology; and California 
Institute of Technology and University of Southern 
California Law Center, respectively. The research sup- 
port provided by the National Science Foundation and 
the Henry Luce Foundation is gratefully acknowl- 
edged. 
IThe details of this meeting and a discussion of 
many of the problems of applications of the theory 
are reported in our referenced paper. 
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1. Theory and Model 
First, we will develop a formal repre- 
sentation of an agenda. Then we will out- 
line an intuitive theory about the nature of 
an agenda's influence, after which we will 
formally state a model. 
A. The Agenda 
The form of agenda we used in resolving 
the club problem can be represented ab- 
stractly as a series of partitions (into two 
sets) of the feasible set of alternatives. Each 
item on the agenda was designed to elimi- 
nate by majority vote some set of alterna- 
tives from further consideration. Our exper- 
imental agendas were similarly constructed. 
We used the following example to explain 
the agenda to subjects during some of our 
experiments. Suppose that we are deciding 
what kind of banquet to give. The agenda 
reads: Item 1. Shall the dress be formal or 
informal? Item 2. Shall the cuisine be 
French or Mexican'? This agenda is modeled 
by Diagram 1. The vote is first on item 1 
and then on item 2. 
Each item on the agenda is designed to 
eliminate some of the alternatives which 
have survived the previous votes. This con- 
tinues until a single alternative remains 
which is the choice of the group. For a fixed 
set of alternatives, the set of all agendas 
corresponds to the set of all such "trees," 
where each tree that can be formed from a 
given set of alternatives represents a differ- 
ent agenda. If, for example, the items above 










are reversed so the first vote is on cuisine 
and the second on attire, then the tree 
would be altered accordingly.2 
B. Basic Theory 
Our basic theory is simple. Where an 
agenda is fixed, it influences outcomes in 
two ways: first, it limits the information 
available to individual decision makers 
about the patterns of preference in the 
group. The primary means available for 
preference revelation is voting, and the con- 
tent of each vote is specified by the form of 
the agenda. In some settings, other means 
of preference revelation such as verbal com- 
munication and/or straw votes can be ruled 
",out of order" by strict adherence to an 
agenda and therefore provide a limited 
means for information generation. And 
where there are many alternatives and 
many people, verbal communications may 
be of limited importance whether permitted 
or not. In addition, on-the-spot coordina- 
tion of decisions among individuals through 
any type of binding agreement is nearly 
impossible in most meetings. This gen- 
erally precludes expressly collusive behavior 
unless it is the result of a premeeting meet- 
ing and, even then, to be effective in plan- 
ning strategy the coalition often needs to 
know both the patterns of preference 
among the group and the agenda to be 
used. Thus, each individual usually finds 
himself in a position of decision making 
under uncertainty. The preferences of 
others will have limited opportunity to in- 
fluence his behavior. 
Second, the agenda determines the set of 
strategies available to the individual. He 
always has the opportunity to choose 
among outcomes, but which outcomes he 
may choose among at any point is deter- 
21t is always possible to represent a tree so that the 
corresponding agenda presents a set of choices the 
group will find acceptable or "natural"? We occa- 
sionally had to expend considerable effort on the 
wording of the agendas we used in experiments and 
suspect that some results cannot be reached using a 
natural appearing agenda. The agenda used during 
the club meeting is reproduced in the authors' paper. 
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mined by the agenda. The individual always 
must pick the particular strategy he prefers 
from among those available. The agenda 
determines what strategies are available. 
So, by reducing the influence of others' 
preferences and by determining the set of 
strategies available to him, the agenda ef- 
fectively influences the voting pattern of 
each individual in the group. It thereby in- 
fluences the choice made by the group. 
C. The Model 
The model is constructed to apply to a 
very broad range of circumstances as well 
as to our experimental setting. However, 
as will be explained below, certain very 
specific operational assumptions were made 
when applying the model in the experi- 
mental environment. 
1. Individual Voting Rules 
As indicated above an agenda item parti- 
tions the set of alternatives into two sets, 
one of which will be eliminated by vote. 
What decision rule will the individual use? 
We have postulated a universe limited to 
three rules. 
Rule 1. The sincere-voting hypothesis. This 
hypothesis holds that an individual faced 
with two sets of alternatives will vote for 
the set which contains his most preferred 
alternative. If he is indifferent between the 
two best alternatives he then decides on the 
basis of a comparison between the second 
ranked alternatives. If he is indifferent be- 
tween these two, then we define the rule to 
be ambiguous.3 
Rule 2. The avoid-the-worst hypothesis: 
Here the individual votes to avoid the al- 
ternative he likes the least. When faced 
with a choice between two sets, he compares 
the least-preferred alternative in each set 
and votes against the set which contains the 
worst of these two. The case of ties is treated 
similarly to the above. 
Rule 3. The average value hypothesis: This 
hypothesis holds that the individual treats 
the group choice as a lottery that will choose 
any alternative in a particular set with equal 
probability. The choice between two sets is 
like a choice between two lotteries (with 
uniform distribution over the outcomes) 
and he chooses (votes for) the one with the 
higher expected utility. The case of ties is 
treated as in rule I above. 
Clearly, these three decision rules do not 
exhaust the set of imaginable decision rules. 
For example, the decision could also be af- 
fected by the variance of the payoff in a set, 
attitudes toward risk, past decisions made 
by the group, or subjective estimates of 
future decisions. If the model were to be re- 
fined further, this might be one of the places 
where it could be improved. 
Our approach to the problem differs from 
that found in economics. We postulate the 
individual as a random variable over these 
decision rules. That is, we as experimenters 
do not know which rule he will use at a 
given point, but we are willing to speculate 
about the probability with which he will use 
a rule. In this "stochastic man" approach 
we are close to models which have had suc- 
cessful applications in marketing (see Frank 
Bass). 
Some notation is needed. 
Q = the universal set of alternatives 
= (JI.,J2. Jm) is an agenda 
where Jk is a partition of each of 
the partitionable sets of JAk I 
into two sets, and Jo = 12 
I = the set of all individuals 
u'(x) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function over Q for i e I 
S(S,S) = $a,, a2, a3 , a4, a5, a6' a7, a8' a9g 
= the set of "states" in which an 
individual may find himself rela- 
tive to two sets S and S of alter- 
natives. These are defined as fol- 
lows. 
a, = All decision rules dictate a vote for S 
over S; or one (or more) decision rule 
dictates a vote for S and the other two 
3The hypothesis as first developed by Robin 
Farquharson continues in the lexicographic fashion. 
An ambiguity in his procedure can occur when the sets 
are of different sizes. This was called to our attention 
by Steven Matthews. 
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(or one) are ambiguous between S 
and S. 
a2 = All decision rules dictate a vote for 
S over S; or one (or more) decision 
rule dictates a vote for S and the other 
two (or one) are ambiguous between 
S and S. 
a3 = One decision rule dictates a vote for 
S, another dictates a vote for S, and 
the other is ambiguous between S and 
S, or all three rules are ambiguous. 
a4 = Decision rule 1 dictates a vote for S 
and both rules 2 and 3 dictate a vote 
for S. 
a5 = Decision rule 2 dictates a vote for S 
while both rules 1 and 3 dictate a vote 
for S. 
a6 = Decision rule 3 dictates a vote for S 
while both rules 1 and 2 dictate a vote 
for S. 
a7 = Both decision rules 1 and 2 dictate a 
vote for S while rule 3 dictates a vote 
for S. 
a, = Both decision rules 1 and 3 dictate a 
vote for S while rule 2 dictates a vote 
for S. 
a9 = Both decision rules 2 and 3 dictate a 
vote for S while rule I dictates a vote 
for S. 
PA(S,S I ak, d) = the probability that in- 
dividual i will vote for the 
set S over the set S given 
that they are imbedded at 
some stage in agenda (a 
and that he finds himself 
in the situation described 
by ak. 
AX IOM 1: Independence from Environ- 
ment. The probability distributions 
PA(S,S Yak, ) are parameterized only by ak 
and for all S, S, 5', S", Pi(S, S ak) = 
Pi(S', S" I ak). 
This means that the individual does not act 
strategically by anticipating upcoming 
votes; his probability of voting is not af- 
fected by previous votes: his probability 
is not affected by discussion at any stage of 
the meeting, set sizes, set labels, etc. It is as 
though he always uses one of the decision 
rules above, and he chooses from among 
them with fixed probabilities. 
AXIOM 2: Stochastically Identical In- 
dividuals. 
Pi(S, S ak) = Pj(S, S ak) for all i,j, S, S, k 
This axiom postulates a certain similarity 
among individuals. It says that the prob- 
ability that any individual votes "yes" 
when he finds himself in any given situation 
is the same for anyone who finds himself in 
that same situation. In addition, this axiom 
declares that the universe of parameters on 
the probability distribution is exhausted by 
the situations enumerated above. 
2. The Strength of S against S 
Suppose the voting rule is a majority rule 
and that in the agenda the set S has been 
pitted against the set S. What is the prob- 
ability that S will win? This probability will 
be called the strength of S against S and can 
be calculated as follows. 
V(S, S, a,k) = the set of people who find 
themselves in situation ak; 
ak e IS(S,S) 
Nk = the number of people in the 
set V(S, S, ak) 
n = the total number of people 
[note: = = n] 
W = (zl,...,zg): zi e integers; 
andO < Zk < Nk;and 
9 :> n2 if n is odd 
n > ,zi v 
n> n 1 > n if n is even 2 
P(S, S) = the probability that the set 
S receives a majority vote 
over the set S in a contest 
between the two. 
THEOREM: 
(1) F(S, S)=ZJJ Nk 
W k=1 (Nk - Zk)!Zk! 
P(S, S I ak)zk(l - P(S, S I ak))Nkzk 
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That this is the appropriate probability 
can be seen by application of the binomial 
probability distribution, the independence 
assumptions and the appropriate area of 
summation. Notice that all we need to 
know to calculate this number is the num- 
ber of people in each set V(S, S, ak) and the 
nine probability numbers represented by 
P(S,SIak),k= 1,...,9. 
3. Strength of an Agenda 
We turn now to the model of primary in- 
terest. What agenda is most likely to yield 
a given alternative x as the group's choice? 
We answer this question by calculating the 
strength of an agenda for an alternative x. 
We do this by first calculating the prob- 
ability under a given agenda that x will be 
the group's choice. With that formula in 
hand, we can then survey all possible 
agendas (which is incidentally no simple 
problem) to find the one which maximizes 
the chance of getting x. 
Consider the agenda a = (JI. Jm). 
We assume there are m items. Each item Jk 
is a partitioning of each set in Jk I into two 
sets. The original set Jo = Q is the set of all 
alternatives. Now since the items of the 
agenda are partitions, each element x E Q 
appears in one and only one set in any 
given item. Call this set S(x, Jk) and the set 
which is pitted against it S(x, Jk) 
Our previous formula (1) allows us to 
state the probability P(S(x, Jk)A S(X, Jk)) 
for any given x and any given Jk. From the 
independence axioms above we know im- 
mediately then that: 
(a) P(x I d) = the probability that x is 
chosen by a group given 
that the agenda is a 
(b) P(x Id) = fl JkEda P(S(x, Jk) S(X, Jk)) 
This is the formula we were seeking at the 
beginning. 
4. Influencing the Group 
In order to apply the theory, we face four 
more problems. First, we must obtain 
preference estimates. The experiments ex- 
plained below involved money payments. 
To simplify, we assumed that people were 
",risk neutral" so utility was linear in money 
payment. The second problem involves ob- 
taining estimates of the nine numbers 
P(S,SIcak),k = 1,..,9. The numbers we 
used were estimated from the pilot experi- 
ments and are provided in Section III. 
The third problem involves the interest- 
ing mathematical problem of finding the 
optimum agenda. For each alternative we 
can compute the probability that it will 
win under any given agenda. Choice of an 
agenda then will be like the choice of a 
lottery so in general the "best" agenda 
would depend upon attitudes toward risk, 
etc. The objective function we use simply 
dictates finding the a which maximizes 
P(x I a). The hard part occurs because of 
the very large number of potential a's. 
Fourth, we must be able to get the group 
to adopt and adhere to the agenda we have 
chosen. This involves devising an agenda 
which presents choices in an acceptable or 
"natural" way, preventing alternative mo- 
tions from reaching the floor. 
II. Experimental Procedures 
We experimented by creating groups 
which had important features of the nat- 
urally occurring processes we wish to un- 
derstand. We deduced these features from 
the club experience: 1) the group uses ma- 
jority rule and a prearranged agenda which 
is followed closely; 2) there is little oppor- 
tunity for premeeting meetings or prede- 
signed coalitions to form prior to the meet- 
ing; 3) there is little or no uncertainty 
among the participants as to their attitudes 
toward the various candidate alternatives; 
4) individuals are not indifferent among 
alternatives. 
The first two conditions were easy to 
meet. Student subjects were recruited from 
Caltech, the University of Southern Cali- 
fornia, and the University of California- 
Los Angeles. An announcement was made 
in classes about the opportunity to par- 
ticipate in a "decision-making experiment." 
They were told that they would attend a 
meeting which would last approximately an 
hour, discuss some issue which had no 
political overtones, and that they would 
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have the opportunity to make "well over 
the hourly wage which any of them might 
be receiving." They were told that the ex- 
perimenters were interested in certain logis- 
tical and technical problems about group 
decision processes; that there was no in- 
terest in psychological variables or personal 
variables; and that they would be subject 
to no harm or embarrassment. 
Meetings took place in a classroom 
beginning at noon. As participants arrived 
they were assigned to seats in accord with a 
function which resulted from a random 
number table. When all participants were 
seated, they were asked to read the instruc- 
tions which had been placed face down on 
their desks. 
We adapted the theory of induced pref- 
erence developed by Vernon Smith to take 
care of third and fourth conditions. The 
set of alternatives Q was a subset of the 
letters of the alphabet. The task of the 
group was to use the appropriate proce- 
dures and choose one letter from this set. 
Each individual i e 81,2,...,nl was given 
a payoff function u'(x), x e Q?, which in- 
dicated the amount of money he would re- 
ceive from the experimenter as a function 
of the alternative chosen by the group. He 
could not mention the amounts of money 
reflected by his payoff and no side pay- 
ments, bribes, or threats were permitted. 
So, as long as an individual preferred more 
money to less, his preference relation over 
Q is given by xRiy u'(x) > ui(y). In our 
case, the amounts involved seemed to us to 
induce well-defined preferences and nonin- 
difference between alternatives. We as- 
sumed in addition that people were risk 
neutral. 
The instructions were read by the experi- 
menter, who did not know at the time 
which alternative the agenda was designed 
to produce. These are included in the Ap- 
pendix. After reading the instructions the 
experimenter answered any questions, 
turned the meeting over to the chairman, 
and seated himself at the back of the room. 
He said nothing during the remainder of 
the experiment except when voting took 
place. He then stood up and recorded votes. 
The chairman for Series 2, 3, and the final 
Series 4 was a Caltech senior majoring in 
physics. He was paid $4.00 per hour. He 
was given the instructions labeled "chair- 
man's instructions" in the Appendix. He 
was not told the purposes of the experiment 
or that we had any expectations about 
which alternatives the group might choose. 
In the debriefing which occurred after the 
final experiment, it was evident that he did 
not know the purposes of the experiments 
and did not suspect that the agenda was a 
key variable. 
The only person present during the ex- 
periment who was aware of which alterna- 
tive was theoretically supposed to occur 
was the graduate research assistant, Steven 
Matthews. He was introduced along with 
the chairman, as a recording secretary. The 
only things he said during the meetings 
were functional to the general task of re- 
cording votes. 
After the procedures had been fully dis- 
cussed and the "test"4 had been adminis- 
tered, the meeting began. The chairman 
took up the first item on the agenda and 
opened the floor for discussion. We asked 
him to encourage discussion on the first 
item. Participants tended to be a little 
hesitant to speak up ("What can I say 
about an A?"), but once discussion started, 
they often were moved to comment. 
After the first item was voted upon, the 
group considered the next item on the 
agenda. On two or three occasions someone 
asked if items could be changed. This was 
not allowed. We suspect that certain types 
of straw votes are effectively changes in the 
agenda and may affect outcomes. Although 
we never prohibited a straw vote, we were 
prepared to rule one out of order if it was 
put in the form of a substitute agenda; for 
example, "If it comes down to box A versus 
box B later, how many will go for A?" We 
did allow one straw vote in this series and 
4We found the test to be very useful. On several 
occasions during our pilot experiments we had reason 
to suspect that participants did not fully understand 
the agenda and/or motions. After we adopted this test, 
mistakes seldom occurred. 
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TABLE 1-ESTIMATES OF P(S, S I ai) MEASURED FROM SERIES 1-3 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 
.96 .04 .50 .38 .17 .61 .39 .83 .62 
we think it did affect the outcome (see 
Table 2). 
When the meeting was over, all subjects 
were paid in cash the amount dictated by 
their payoff sheet and the alternative chosen 
by the group. 
III. Results 
A total of four experimental series were 
conducted. The first three series, which are 
treated as pilots, served two functions. 
First, the procedures as reported here and 
the instructions (used in the fourth series) 
had been revised to take account of prob- 
lems encountered in these first three series. 
The second function of the pilot experi- 
ments was to provide data from which the 
probability parameters used in the model 
could be estimated. Both the numbers re- 
ported in Table 3 and the design of the 
Series 4 experiments were based on these 
estimates (see Table 1). 
Series 4 consisted of four experimental 
sessions. The set of alternatives, Q, contains 
five elements. The payoff schedules used in 
all four sessions are listed in Table 2. The 
majority-rule relation is also shown there. 
Alternative 1 beats all others in any binary 
contest and Alternative 5 is beaten (unan- 
imously) by any of the others in a binary 
contest. The other three alternatives are 
involved in a cycle. For each of the first 
four alternatives, an agenda exists which 
would yield that alternative with a prob- 
ability equal to one according to our model. 
We would have preferred to avoid the cycle, 
but we were unable to find a noncyclic ex- 
ample for which a probability one agenda 
could be constructed according to our 
model for each feasible5 item, given the 
probabilities measured from Series 1. 
The results of these experiments are in 
Figure 1; Experiments 1, 3, and 4, which 
were designed to get Alternatives 3, 2, and 
1, respectively, performed exactly as antic- 
ipated. Each resulted in the choice of alter- 
natives for which the agenda was designed. 
The agenda for Experiment 2 was de- 
signed for Alternative 4, but the group 
chose Alternative 1. This resulted because a 
straw vote revealed the fact that Alterna- 
tive 5 (labeled D in this experiment) was 
least preferred by all individuals. Does this 
call into question the basic assumptions of 
our model? We think not. This straw vote, 
we claim, effectively changed the agenda to 
one on the figure labeled "Alternate Speci- 
fication: Series 4-Experiment 2." For this 
TABLE 2--SERIES 4 PAYOFFS IN DOLLARS 
Alternative 
Person 1 2 3 4 5 
l 6.00 7.00 5.00 8.00 0.50 
2 6.00 7.00 5.00 8.00 0.50 
3 6.00 7.00 5.00 8.00 0.50 
4 6.00 7.00 5.00 8.00 0.50 
5 6.00 7.00 5.00 8.00 0.50 
6 6.00 7.00 5.00 8.00 0.50 
7 7.50 7.75 6.75 5.75 0.25 
8 7.50 7.75 6.75 5.75 0.25 
9 7.50 7.75 6.75 5.75 0.25 
10 7.50 7.75 6.75 5.75 0.25 
11 7.50 7.00 6.00 8.00 0.50 
12 8.00 7.50 7.00 6.00 0.50 
13 8.00 7.50 7.00 6.00 0.50 
14 8.00 7.50 7.00 6.00 0.50 
15 7.00 5.50 7.50 6.50 0.25 
16 7.00 5.50 7.50 6.50 0.25 
17 7.00 5.50 7.50 6.50 0.25 
18 7.00 5.50 7.50 6.50 0.25 
19 7.00 5.50 7.50 6.50 0.25 
20 7.00 5.50 7.50 6.50 0.25 
21 7.00 5.50 7.50 6.50 0.25 
3 
Majority Rule 
Relation I 2 - 4 S 
Ist cycle last 5Alternative 5 is possible only with extremely low 
probabilities. 
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SERIES 4- Experiment I 




SERIES 4- Experiment 2 
I 00 
A-4 1.00 ~ 0 
B-2 
0-3 
D-5 D j 
16-5 
v 
SERIES 4 - Experiment 2' 
. E*(~~~~1.00) 
A 
A-I4 \4 B 
8 -(2 1.00 c 
0 -3 E *9 
D-5 13-8L0 fl*I 93)-' E- I Li~~~~1 16-5 
V 
SERIES 4 -Experiment 3 
10 0 MA 
A 
-IA 
8 -5 8 9 
C0-4 c ZZE 
Dey .00 
SERIES 4 - Experiment 4 
1.00 A 
A A A -2 8 o- 
8 -5 . 99 
0 - 
-Key: . 
Wei means that x is the strength ao the set aver its complement 
as determined by the model. 
means that x is the strength oa the agenda in tting this 
cst alternative. Each agenda was designed to get the alternative 
so marked. 
means that at this stage the vote went 'our way" by a vote 
V1 at n to Y. 
- y\ means that at this stage we 'lost" by a vote at x to y. 
* indicates the actual final choice by the group. 
FIGURE I 
alternate agenda the model predicts letter 
E, the one actually chosen with a .93 prob- 
ability. 
We now come to the most basic of ques- 
tions. What are we prepared to say we have 
learned about our general theory and how 
can we easily summarize our beliefs? The 
following Bayesian argument is enlighten- 
ing if we start from the two competing 
generalizations which existed before the 
research was initiated: 
00: The outcome of the process does not 
depend upon the agenda. That is, 
there exists a probability distribution 
P(x) over outcomes x e Q which is 
not functionally dependent upon the 
agenda, although it may depend on 
other parameters. 
AI: The outcome of the process does de- 
pend upon the agenda. That is, there 
exists a probability distribution 
P(x I e ) over outcomes x e Q which 
is functionally dependent upon the 
agenda in addition to other param- 
meters. 
Cast in this framework the arguments in 
favor of 0, are very persuasive if we adopt 
the position of a critic who initially had low 
expectations about the truth of 01. Suppose, 
for example, we make the following as- 
sumptions where x is the observed sequence 
of outcomes: 
i) The a priori probabilities are P(OO) - 
.8 and P(0 ) = .2 
ii) P(x I 00) is the maximum likelihood 
estimate .015625 
iii) P(x I O,) is the prediction of the model 
With these assumptions the a posteriori 
probability that 0, is true is .94. This critic 
is certainly impressed. 
If our critic would not allow our explana- 
tion of Series 4-Experiment 2, then a repeti- 
tion of the argument above would show 
that he has learned much less from Series 4. 
Our own priors which had resulted from 
observing pilot experiments were on the 
order of P(0 ) = .9 so without our Experi- 
ment 2 explanation, we learned very little 
from the experimental series. Since the cost 
of an additional experiment is about $170 
and any critic can study the pilot runs, we 
elected not to try to convince this critic 
until we found a setting within which we 
could learn something additional ourselves. 
We conclude that the agenda influences the 
outcome. 
Even though our general theory may be 
right, the specific means of expressing or 
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TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMESC 
Probability Probability 
Series Mean of Standard Number of of of 
Experiment Win Votes Deviation Win Votesa 
Item a x (x-0) /a Actually Outcome 
Taken 
1-1-1 11.57 1.67 -.48 12 .257 .90 
1-1-2 13.83 1.16 -.71 15 1.01 1.00 .65 
1-1-3 10.84 1.71 -.65 11 .094 .79 
1-1-4 10.85 .95 -.47 11 .158 .93 
1-2-1 11.57 1.67 -.48 15 2.06 .90 
1-2-2 13.83 1.16 -.71 19 4.46 1.00 
.65 
1-2-3 10.84 1.71 -.65 12 .679 .79 
1-2-4 10.85 .95 -.47 13 2.27 .93 
1-3-lb 10.85 1.67 -.48 9 -1.54 .10 
1-3-2 10.54 1.15 -.41 11 .400 .83 .08 
1-3-3 12.20 1.38 -.62 11 -.869 .97 
1-4-1 11.57 1.67 -.48 11 -.341 .90 
1-4-2 11.48 1.37 -.69 13 1.11 .93 .82 
1-4-3 12.37 1.16 -.65 14 1.40 .99 
1-5-1 11.00 1.59 -.78 13 1.26 .83 
1-5-2 11.17 1.52 -.34 16 3.18 .87 
.58 
1-5-3 12.21 1.48 -.72 13 .534 .97 
1-5-4 10.40 1.05 -.40 10.5 .095 .82 
1-6-1 11.03 1.43 -.45 12 .679 .86 
1-6-2 10.58 1.46 -.64 11 .288 .78 
.61 
1-6-3 11.21 1.16 -.77 12 .682 .93 
1-6-4 12.62 1.42 -.88 13 .267 .98 
2-1-1 19.49 1.14 -.94 21 1.32 1.00 
2-1-2b 13.34 1.90 -1.11 10 -1.76 .07 .07 
2-1-3 11.85 1.00 -.48 13 1.15 .92 
3-1-1 17.42 1.64 -1.10 20 1.58 1.00 .08 
3-1-2(Item 5)b 11.85 1.00 -.48 10 -1.85 .08 
3-2-lb 19.26 1.21 -.98 8 -9.33 .00 00 
3-2-2 17.19 1.69 -1.13 16 .706 1.00 
4-1-1 18.34 1.44 -1.04 21 1.85 1.00 1.00 
4-1-2 13.65 1.00 -.64 15 1.35 1.00 
4-2-lb 17.65 1.59 -1.09 8 -6.08 .00 
4-2-2b 16.73 1.78 -1.16 5 -6.59 .00 .00 
4-2-3 19.95 .99 -.87 21 1.06 1.00 
4-2'-1 12.73 1.27 -.77 13 .213 .96 96 
4-2'-2 13.65 1.00 -.64 16 2.35 1.00 
4-3-1 17.65 1.59 -1.09 18 .220 1.00 1.00 
4-3-2(Item 3)b 13.65 1.00 -.64 14 .350 1.00 
4-4-1 17.42 1.64 -1.10 20 1.58 1.00 1.00 
4-4-2 13.65 1.00 -.64 14 .350 1.00 
a"Win" means that vote went in the direction indicated most probable by the model. 
bThese experiments did not result in the anticipated outcome. 
cData were pooled from all experiments except 1-3, 3-2, 4-2, 4-2'. 
modeling it that we have developed is im- 
perfect. First, the model made a probability 
one prediction which did not occur. Modi- 
fications to allow for straw votes may 
eliminate the problem. Secondly, we can, 
from Series 4, test the values of two param- 
eters. The hypothesis that P(S,S |I a1) = .96, 
the number used in the model is accepted 
at the .01 level of significance. This is par- 
ticularly interesting since it indicates that 
when individuals are in certain circum- 
stances, our model of individual decisions 
is very good indeed. Psychological or other 
theoretical modifications are unnecessary 
When all three rules cast compatible deci. 
sions, almost all behavior is explained 
However, there were 32 votes cast from a, 
of which 27 were cast in the proper direc- 
tion. According to the model these consti. 
tuted 32 Bernoulli trials, each of which ha( 
a probability P of going in the proper di. 
rection. The hypothesis that P(S,S I ag) = 
.62, the value used in the model, is rejectec 
at the .01 level of significance. From this we 
know that our model could be improved by 
modifying the parameter values. 
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TABLE 4-CONSISTENT USE OF VOTING RULES 
(Number of Individuals in Y*) 
Behavior 
Series and Behavior Behavior Behavior Consistent 
Experiment Consistent Consistent Consistent with None of 
Number with Rule I with Rule 2 with Rule 3 the Rules Total 
1-1 1 1 6 2 10 
1-2 4 1 1 4 10 
1--3 0 0 0 1 1 
1-4 0 0 6 0 6 
1-5 1 0 1 2 4 
1-6 1 0 3 2 6 
Total -= .19 - = .05 - =.46 -=.30 37 
37 37 37 37 
Note: Rule 1 = Sincere; Rule 2 = worst avoidance; Rule 3 = average value. 
Y$ = the set of individuals for which the consistent use of any of the three voting 
rules would have been inconsistent with the consistent use of either of the other two 
voting rules. 
Table 3 provides a comparison between 
the actual vote and the predicted vote for 
each item of each experiment including all 
pilot series. The most significant thing 
about this table is the apparent conservatism 
in the model suggested by the very infre- 
quent instances of the actual vote falling 
short of the expected vote (8 out of 40 
cases). This conservatism shows up again 
on the histogram of Figure 2. If the theo- 
retical distribution of votes for each item 
was normal, then the histogram should ap- 
proach a normal distribution curve. But, 
for all items the theoretical distribution of 
votes was significantly skewed to the left 
(as shown by V3 on the table). Since the 
histogram is strongly skewed to the right, 
the accuracy of the model is in even more 
doubt than the nonnormality of the histo- 
No Items Histogram Normohized Deviotions from Theory 
t0 - 





O o 1 _ | \ 0 
-0-2.5 2S5--2 -2-. -15 --.5 -.SO -.5- Z 011  I.-2 2-2.5 2.5-c 
Y . z .,- ") 
gram suggests. We suspect that this is a 
type of "bandwagon effect," but we have 
not tested for this. 
Of particular interest to us were the pat- 
terns of individual decisions. Does an in- 
dividual always use the same decision rule? 
Of the 261 individuals who participated in 
these experiments, only 37 were involved in 
a series of voting situations which would 
necessarily6 reveal the individual's voting 
rule. Table 4 indicates 70 percent of these 
37 subjects exhibited consistent behavior. 
The average value hypothesis was the most 
popular with about 46 percent of these sub- 
jects using it. The next largest group, 30 
percent, used none of the rules consistently. 
The fact that so many individuals did not 
consistently use any of the rules suggests 
that some sort of probabilistic treatment of 
individual decision rules may always be 
necessary. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Our research incorporates several fea- 
tures not found (at least all in one place) in 
the economics and politics literature. First, 
our characterization of voting procedures is 
6Any individual from among the 37 who consis- 
tently used any of the three rules would have exhibited 
behavior inconsistent with the use of either of the 
other two rules. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.186 on Thu, 19 Dec 2013 14:50:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
156 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 1978 
different from that found in the social 
choice and voting literature. With the ex- 
ception of Farquharson, research in those 
areas focuses on processes in which alterna- 
tives are considered in a series of binary 
(two at a time) contests. The voting proce- 
dure we study involves voting between sets 
of issues. Our theory is decision theoretic 
in origin, but we depart from the traditional 
decision-theoretic mode of analysis by treat- 
ing individuals as random variables over 
decision rules. Finally, our choice of an ex- 
perimental methodology is certainly not 
typical of modes of analysis used by econ- 
omists. Our posture is simple. If by using 
our ideas about the influence of the agenda, 
we are unable to influence the decisions of 
groups in a simple laboratory setting, then 
we cannot in good faith claim that our 
theory works in the more complicated "real 
world" case. 
Experimental results indicate that within 
a range of circumstances the agenda can in- 
deed be used to influence the outcome of a 
committee decision. Although the model we 
present needs improvement, the basic theory 
seems correct. 
APPENDIX 
INSTRUCTIONS USED IN SERIES 4 
Chairman Instructions 
You are employed to serve as chairnman 
of several committee meetings. The time and 
location of these meetings are on the at- 
tached page. Each meeting will last about 
forty-five minutes. You; should be at the 
designated location thirty minutes before 
the meeting starts and you should have 
familiarized yourself with the rules of order 
which are attached. For your participation 
you will be paid $5.00 per hour plus any 
necessary expenses, for example, parking, 
which you incur. 
These meetings are part of a series of 
experiments designed to test theories about 
decision processes. Beyond this introductory 
remark, you will not be made aware of the 
purposes of the experiments until after the 
entire series has been completed. You should 
avoid talking with anyone about any aspects 
of the experiments, your employment, or 
about any possibly related theories. You 
should avoid circumstances in which you 
might inadvertently become informed. Do 
not try to guess the nature of the hypotheses 
or supply your own theories. After the final 
meeting you will receive a detailed explana- 
tion. 
The first thing to do is check the dates 
and the times. Make sure you can be there. 
They are listed here as "Attachment No. I." 
Attachment 2 is a copy of the instructions 
that members of the committee will receive. 
You should read these instructions now. 
Here are some things that should be un- 
derlined: 
1. People are free to say anything they wish 
which pertains to the motion on the floor. 
If discussions are "out of order," you can 
make that judgment. In particular, the fol- 
lowing are not to be allowed: 
a) Statements which contain dollar or 
quantitative references; 
b) Straw votes on issues other than the 
current issue to be discussed and voted 
upon, as will be explicitly described 
on the agenda; and 
c) Threats or dealings between com- 
mittee members to be carried through, 
during, or after the experiment is over. 
2. Majority rule means a majority of those 
present. A vote passes if it receives 11 or 
more votes. If an item on the agenda fails 
both votes, you call for more discussion. 
After discussion another vote is taken. If 
neither passes you move to the next item on 
the agenda. An ambiguity after all items on 
the agenda are covered, can be resolved by 
a motion from the floor. 
Parliamentary Rules for Chairman 
Read the appropriate portions at the ap- 
propriate times. 
Recognition Rule: Raise your hand to 
be recognized by the chair. 
Voting Rule: The basic voting rule is 
simple majority rule. An issue passes if it 
passes by a majority of those voting. 
Rule to Break Ties (read this if neces- 
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sary): If a tie vote occurs, discussion of the 
motion is again opened. After debate a 
second vote is taken. If a tie occurs again, 
debate is opened again and a vote is taken. 
If a tie occurs again, the committee moves 
to consider the next issue. Any ambiguity 
at the end of the last item can be removed 
by a motion from the floor. 
Rule to End Debate: If someone wishes 
to end the debate on an item they simply 
move to end debate. If there is no objection 
to ending debate the item is voted upon. 
(Read if necessary): If there is objec- 
tion to ending debate, the motion to end 
debate will be recognized by the chair. A 
vote on the motion to end debate will be 
taken. If it passes by 2/3 majority of those 
voting the debate ends. If the motion to end 
debate fails, debate on the main motion 
continues. 
AGENDA: The agenda committee has 
adopted the agenda which is before you. 
Notice that each item on the agenda is de- 
signed to restrict the number of programs 
which may receive further consideration. 
Example: Choice of banquet 
Alternative Type of Food Dress 
1 Mexican Formal 
2 Mexican Informal 
3 French Formal 
4 French Informal 
Item 1. Shall we have a formal dress ban- 
quet or not? Notice that an answer to this 
question will restrict further deliberation to 
either 
IiIg or 
Item 2. What type of food? Notice that an 
answer to this question is now all that we 
need to decide upon a specific alternative, 
as shown in Diagram 2. 
Instructions for Committee Members 
1. We would like for you to participate 
in a committee process experiment. The 
purpose of the experiment is to help us 






generally complex ways in which com- 
mittees operate. Support for this research 
was supplied by the National Science 
Foundation and the Henry Luce Founda- 
tion. 
2. All you have to do is attend a com- 
mittee meeting and for this participation 
you will be paid. The purpose of the meet- 
ing is to choose by majority rule a letter 
from the set of letters [A, B, C, D, F]. Only 
one of the five letters will be chosen and the 
payment you receive for participation 
depends entirely upon which one it is. For 
example, on the table on page 3, the amount 
listed beside the letter A is the amount you 
will receive if it is chosen by the com- 
mittee; the amount beside B is the payment 
you will receive if it is the majority decision, 
etc. 
Different individuals will receive different 
payoffs depending upon which letter the 
committee chooses. The letter which would 
result in the highest payment to you may 
not result in the highest payment to some- 
one else. You should decide after delibera- 
tion how you wish the committee to vote 
and make whatever efforts you might want 
to get the vote to go that way. However, in 
general, we as experimenters are not con- 
cerned with whether or how you participate 
in the committee's effort to select a letter. 
We want the meeting to proceed in an 
orderly fashion so we have provided a few 
parliamentary procedures which must be 
followed. These will be explained by the 
chairman. We also want to make sure that 
you understand the consequences of your 
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votes and any resulting committee decision. 
For this purpose we ask you to answer the 
question on page 4 after the chairman has 
reviewed the rules and the agenda. 
3. Here are some incidentals: 
a) The basic procedure will be simple 
majority rule. We will also follow the agenda 
prepared by an agenda committee. This 
agenda is outlined on page 3 and should be 
studied carefully. It will also be covered by 
the chairman. 
b) You will from time to time be vot- 
ing. We have appointed a recording secre- 
tary to record all votes. This can take some 
time so we ask you to hold your hands high 
until all votes are recorded. 
c) You will be paid in cash immediately 
after the meeting. You may not reveal any 
quantitative information about your pay- 
ment. If you wish you can say that one 
yields more than another, but you may not 
say how much more. The amounts may 
differ among committee members and only 
you are to know anything about how much 
you may receive. 
d) Before or during the meeting please 
do not discuss with other committee mem- 
bers any activity to take place after the 
meeting which may involve you jointly. 
Under no circumstances may you make 
threats or "deals" to split your payment 
from the meeting with another committee 
member. 
4. Are there any questions? 
SERIEs 4: EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
Individual Payment and Agenda Section of 
Individual Instructions. Committee Mem- 
ber 
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DIAGRAM 3 
Item 1. Do we want to consider further 
only the letters A and B, or only the letters 
C, D, and E? (Check your vote.) 
I am in favor of considering further 
only the letters A and B. 
I am in favor of considering further 
only the letters C, D, and E. 
Item 2a. (If the letters A, B are chosen at 
Item 1, then this item is applicable---if not, 
then go to 2b.) Which do we want, A or B? 
I am in favor of A. 
I am in favor of B. 
Item 2b. (If the letters C, D, and E are 
chosen at Item 1, then this item is applicable 
otherwise go to 2a.) Do we want to con- 
sider further only the letters D and E, or do 
we want to stop with C? 
_I am in favor of C. 
..I am in favor of considering further 
only the letters D and E. 
Item 3. Do we want D or E? 
__ I am in favor of D. 
__I am in favor of E. 
Agenda Test Section of 
Individual Instructions 
1. Suppose the top box at Item 1, the one 
that contains the letters A and B, received a 
majority of the votes, then the next item to 
be considered on the agenda is , and 
it consists of a vote between the letter(s) 
and the letter(s) 
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2. Suppose at Item 1 the box of letters 
that contains the letters C, D, and E is 
chosen by a majority. Then the next item to 
to be considered on the agenda is , and 
it consists of a vote between the letter(s) 
and the letter(s) 
3. If the box of letters that contains A 
and B received a majority vote at Item 1, 
would there be a vote at Item 3? Answer Yes 
or No: __. If it happened that the box of 
letters containing C, D, and E received a 
majority of votes at Item 1, and a vote was 
not needed at Item 3, then the box contain- 
ing the letter __ must have received the 
majority of votes and thus would be the 
committee's final choice. 
4. If at each item the lower arrow was 
followed by the majority of votes, then the 
committee will have made _ the final 
choice and you will receive the amount 
as your payoff. 
5. How much will you receive if the com- 
mittee's final choice is: D?_ B?_ 
C? A?___ 
SERIES 4: EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4 
Individual Payment and Agenda Section of 
Individual Instructions. Committee Mem- 
ber No. 






AGENDA are shown in Diagram 4. 
Item 1. Do we want to consider further only 
the letters A, B, and C, or only the letters 
D and E? (Check your vote.) 
__ I am in favor of considering further 
only the letters A, B, and C. 
__ I am in favor of considering further 
only the letters D and E. 
Item 2a. (If the letters A, B, and C are 
chosen at Item 1 then this item is applicable 
-if not then go to 2b.) Do we want to con- 
AGENDA 
I I t Item 3 Item 2a 
ter * I2 
A I L~r-At4InB 
8 B cjj 




~~~~~~~ll I 1 L3 1 
DIAGRAM 4 
sider further only the letters A and B, or do 
we want to stop with C? 
I am in favor of considering further 
only the letters A and B. 
I am in favor of C. 
Item 2b. (If the letters D and E are chosen at 
Item 1, then this item is applicable other- 
wise go to 2a.) Which do we want, D or E? 
I am in favor of D. 
I am in favor of E. 
Item 3. Do we want A or B? 
I am in favor of A. 
I am in favor of B. 
Agenda Test Section of 
Individual Instruction 
1. Suppose the box at Item 1, the one 
that contains the letters A, B, and C, re- 
ceived a majority of the votes. Then, the 
next item to be considered on the agenda is 
,__ and it consists of a vote between the 
letter(s) and the letter(s) 
2. Suppose at Item 1 the box of letters 
that contains the letters D and E is chosen 
by a majority. Then the next item to be 
considered on the agenda is , and it 
consists of a vote between the letter(s) 
and the letter(s) 
3. If the box of letters that contains D 
and E received a majority vote at Item 1, 
would there be a vote at Item 3? Answer 
Yes or No __. If it happened that the box 
of letters containing A, B, and C received a 
majority of votes at Item 1, and a vote was 
not needed at Item 3, then the box contain- 
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ing the letter __ must have received the 
majority of votes and thus would be the 
committee's final choice. 
4. If at each item the lower arrow was 
followed by the majority of votes, then the 
committee will have made __ the final 
choice and you will receive the amount 
as your payoff. 
5. How much will you receive if the com- 
mittee's final choice is: 
D?___ B?_ C?___ E?_ 
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